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Abstract   
 
The objective of this research is to identify the position of Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia (PAS) as a party during their muktamar (general assembly) on June 6 in 
Kuala Selangor. PAS leadership has been dominated by ulama leaders, labelled 
‘traditionalist’ or ‘purist’ and the ‘mainstreamer’ or ‘reformist’ had admit that 
they have lost their positions in the party. The focus of this research is to identify 
that when Hadi had successfully purged the reformist from being a part of the 
party members, he and his factions had made an unpredictable action to withdraw 
from multi-ethnic opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) in June 16, 2015. As 
a result, PR was dissolved and the rift worsened after the PAS leadership was 
captured by conservatives and the party accepted a motion by its conservative 
ulama (clerics) wing to sever ties with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and 
People Justice Party (PKR). Hadi realized that it is near impossible for PAS to be 
in power on the national level without assistance from the opposition parties. 
However, this research found that although Hadi was a veteran politician, he 
asserted that his ideology, characterized, political thought and the way he solved 
the political problem are against PH. Hadi was categorized as an arrogant person, 
often disagrees with his colleagues, lacking of coalition spirit and always making 
controversial statements toward PH.    
 
Keywords  :  organization, mainstreamer, reformist, ulama and politicians 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The result of the 61st Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) muktamar (general assembly) in 
Kuala Selangor, June 6, 2015 revealed that the PAS leadership has been dominated by 
ulama leaders, labelled as ‘traditionalist’ or ‘purist’ and the ‘mainstreamer’ or ‘reformist’ 
had to admit that they have lost their positions in the party. PAS President Abdul Hadi 
Awang believes that his party will continuously be a competitive party even without the 
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reformist. The result of the muktamar was well organized by Hadi and his followers, and 
they will ensure that only those with religious background knowledge will be retained at 
the top brass of PAS leadership while the reformist have opted to make a decision 
whether to keep their loyalty and willing to accept defeat or quit the party and create a 
splinter party - the reformist choose the second option.1 Therefore, the reformist factions 
had agreed to form a new political party on Sept 16, 2015 known as The Trust Party 
(AMANAH).  
 
Ironically, during the former PAS President Fadzil Noor’s era, he encouraged 
many professionals to give up their university or government positions and participate in 
the party as full-time activists in the 1998-99 national crisis, which PAS doubled its 
membership from 400,000 to 800,000 within months (Liew Chin Tong 2007 : 205). The 
influx of new recruits updated the membership profile from that of being mainly led by 
rural-based religious scholars at various levels to one that included the new urban middle 
class created by the social engineering of the New Economic Policy (NEP). His 
successor, however, Abdul Hadi Awang had done much detriment to the party when he 
and his followers had purged almost all the reformist factions through the muktamar. 
Hadi will ensure that only those with religious background knowledge will control the 
party management and he still believes that PAS will be a stronger party without the 
support from the reformist.   
 
 In comparison, in the early years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that rule 
Japan, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) had been a powerful and seemingly growing party. 
It had the support of a large number of young, well-educated urban electorate as well as 
the organized blue-collar workers, precisely those constituencies numbers were being 
rapidly increased by Japan’s rush toward industrialization (Curtis 1988 : 117). In 
addition, local professional politicians, lawyers, journalists and a number of high-ranking 
national government bureaucrats who saw the JSP as a vehicle to national politics power 
also populated its Diet member contingent. Seen as a party of the future by many of the 
politically ambitious, it was able to draw a relatively large pool of talent for its Diet 
candidates. Union leaders accounted less than 30 percent of JSP candidates in the first 
post-merger lower house election in 1985. Two decades later, the JSP had changed their 
political strategy and channeled almost through that part of the union movement 
organized into the Sohyo2 union federation. As a result, by relying so heavily on Sohyo, 
the JSP declined in popularity among voters and by the 1970s, JSP was no longer a 
predominant urban party. In the 1976 lower house election, for example, it won 60 
percent of its seats in semi urban and rural districts. Only 26 percent of his lower house 
members were elected in urban districts and just 14 percent in metropolitan ones (Curtis 
1988 : 118).   
 
 When Hadi had successfully purged the reformist from being a part of the party 
members, he and his factions had made an unpredictable action to withdraw from a multi-
ethnic opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 3 in June 16, 2015. As a result, PR was 
dissolved and the rift worsened after the PAS leadership was captured by conservatives 
and the party accepted a motion by its conservative ulama (clerics) wing to sever ties 
with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and People Justice Party (PKR). In response, 
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DAP's Secretary General Lim Guan Eng said in a statement that the PR no longer existed. 
Analysts believe the DAP and PKR will try to link up with a new partner to form a new 
opposition pact before the next general election because this is their only realistic path to 
defeating Barisan Nasional (BN). Therefore, after the PR dissolved, a new opposition 
path called Pakatan Harapan (PH) was founded on Sept 22, 2015 consisting of the 
former PR parties except PAS and two splinter parties; AMANAH and Malaysian United 
Indigenous Party (Bersatu).4  
 
 This article analyses the distinctive patterns of conflict and frictions that have 
emerged within PAS and its relations to PH. Two distinctive patterns have become 
particularly conspicuous. First, the triumphant performance of PR in general election 
(GE) 2008 and 2013 has in great part been attribute to opposition pact strategies and 
many vacancies was offered to the party members upon political appointments. However, 
what will happen to those who are appointed upon political appointments when Hadi and 
his factions finally agreed to sever ties with PH? In addition, should the PAS’s 
assemblyman be loyal to the party even though some of them disagree what Hadi and his 
factions had done. For instance, the DAP has asked PAS representatives to resign from 
their posts from the Penang state government and its agencies. PAS does not hold any 
influence in the state assembly as it has only one lawmaker while DAP dominates the 40-
seat state legislature with 29 assemblymen. 
 
 Second, prior to the existence of PR and PH, there was a political cooperation in 
1999 among opposition parties and it was known as Barisan Alternatif (BA). However, 
on the political front, the conservative Islamalist position of PAS leadership under the 
newly elected President Abdul Hadi Awang severely offended their non-Muslim political 
partners, especially the Chinese-dominant DAP, in the then opposition coalition pact, 
BA. As a result, DAP withdrew from the coalition altogether and the opposition pact was 
dissolved in 2004 (Kikue Hamayotsu 2010 : 165). What surprised and bewildered outside 
observers was why PAS antagonism towards DAP despite their status also as opposition 
party? As Liew Ching Tong (2007 : 201) mentioned that it is near possible for PAS to 
win national power on its own and it was supported by Mohd Izani (2014 : 42), PAS 
believed that to compete in democratic politics which has become increasingly 
competitive in Malaysia, it should accept and participate in the sharing power. In other 
words, PAS can no longer move alone even if the party is the only opposition party that 
managed to survive since the first election in 1955. Why have these trends grown 
conspicuous within PAS?    
 
PAS antagonism towards PH 
 
The PH’s triumphant in the GE 2013 attest that political cooperation was the best 
strategies to be in power. Once in power, the PH could create a job vacancy through 
political appointments and most of the posts were occupied based on politics connection 
rather than qualification. The political post was created after winning an election and it 
gives government jobs to its supporters, friends and relatives as a reward for working 
toward victory and the post was a contract or had nothing limit. Mohamad Sabu and 
Mujahid Yusof Rawa, for example, had taken the challenge to resign from their posts in 
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various state agencies when Hadi had declared that PAS had no longer ties with PH. The 
question was does Hadi realize what he had done to PAS when his party had sever ties 
with PH and could all the PAS members follow Hadi’s summons in order to reveal their 
loyalty to the party?   
 
As a veteran politician, Hadi realized that it is near impossible for PAS to be in 
power on the national level without assistance from the opposition parties. Besides that, 
PAS has claimed they have a million members and many party branches all over 
Malaysia - this statement perceived that PAS could achieve the election victory despite 
being alone. However, in the plural society, working alone to topple BN was not a good 
idea as Mahathir argued after his party had joint PH, "when I fought the previous 
elections under BN, I knew the opposition would lose because they were fighting each 
other. That's why we need a united opposition coalition," he was reported to have said, 
according to a post on Facebook. Mahathir had urged the component parties to set aside 
their ideological differences and unite if the coalition wished to defeat Najib’s 
administration.  
 
 In GE 13, PR had retained their victory in Penang, Selangor and Kelantan and 
technically Penang was ruled by DAP, PAS in Kelantan and PKR in Selangor. In the 
state legislative, PAS had won one from 40 seats in Penang and 15 over 56 seats in 
Selangor and this result asserts that PAS had shown their good performance in Selangor. 
When Hadi and his followers urged their party members to sever ties with PR, Selangor 
PAS leaders, in particular, scrambled to warn party bosses against going through with the 
motion to sever ties with DAP (read PR), which the leadership forced through the 
assembly without debate, much to the anger of some delegates. In principle, PAS 
members should show their loyalty to the state government after the party has severed 
ties with PR, but this did not work and the top brass of PAS leadership did not instruct 
their members to resign from their state posts. In this scenario, what is more important; 
holding on to your principles or your posts?  
 
Kikue Hamayotsu (2010 : 166) argued that Hadi and his followers were 
increasingly dissatisfied with their party’s diminishing influence within PH despite 
making huge ideological compromise to stay within the coalition. Some of the PAS 
supporters insisted that PR should be led by PAS due to their party’s experience in 
politics, background and reputation. Hadi and others top party leaders felt disappointed 
when some of his senior party members left PAS and form AMANAH. Once AMANAH 
had been registered, Hadi constantly gave negative perspective towards that party and 
assumed that AMANAH will be eliminated within two years from its formation. Besides 
that, Hadi believes that AMANAH will never get any support from voters because almost 
all of the AMANAH members were not loyal to the mother party.  
 
Tan (2002 : 150) argued that it is often noted that, like any large organizations, 
political parties hesitant to change if the changes does not bring any benefits to the party. 
The question was what will happen to the party’s mission when Hadi and his followers 
purged the reformist and do their party management will be more systematic if the party 
is merely led by the ulama? Without reformist in the party committee, what changes have 
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been made by PAS? After GE 13, Kelantan was ruled by PAS and no evidence showed 
that Kelantan administration become more reliable after the reformist had purged from 
the party. Only heard from PAS top brass of leadership that they will implement hudud 
law in Kelantan and in general, hudud was an old issue and had become an election 
campaign before PAS ruled the Kelantan. However, until now, PAS has failed to 
implement hudud law in Kelantan although Kelantan Menteri Besar had repeated his 
promises to implement hudud law latest by 2015. Besides that, the Kelantan government 
faced a chronic management and administration leak when they were burdened with court 
suits such as the people highway issue and the Kelantan Timber Complex.  
 
PAS believed that politicians who had lost in the muktamar will retire, be inactive 
in politics or not involved in any political party. However, their believe totally changed 
when the losers in the muktamar have set up a new party and gave competition to their 
old party. After the formation of AMANAH, PAS have made sundry negative perspective 
against AMANAH and the most negative view was by the PAS President. He made a   
controversial statement that AMANAH will survive only two years after the formation. 
Basically, the process of set up a new party or a splinter party is not an odd phenomenon 
in the political system because Japan politics experienced the same when Ichiro Ozawa 
declared out of the LDP and set up a new party to give pressure to his old party. Ozawa 
with some of his colleagues and supporters have arranged a brilliant idea and set up a 
strong pact due to ensure that the LDP is no longer a ruling party and Ozawa's planning 
hit the target when they win the 1993 general election.  (Christensen 2000 : 11-12).      
 
Power sharing 
 
The idea of power sharing is important to create a space for competing groups to share 
their view, working together and perhaps to be able to avoid hostility. The reality was 
sharing limited resources work best in the plural context allowing each competing entity 
to acknowledge the need to work collectively. To stay in power as a dominant party, BN 
can be seen as a role model due to their success to reign Malaysia for six decades. This 
complex multiethnic nation is being integrated wisely by a government that seeks to 
ensure that plurality and diversity are accepted in a delicately balanced relationship 
(Shamsul 2011 : 35). Furthermore, the power sharing formula is adopted by BN was 
applied since 1973 and successfully able to maintain its domination as the ruling party 
since independent of 1957 until 2018. Although the GE in 2018 and 2013 marked a 
significant shift of urban voters and the loss of 2/3 majority in the parliamentary seats to 
the opposition, BN still rules (Kartini Aboo Talib 2013 : 278).  
 
 Political scientist scholars such as Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1991) argue that power 
sharing was the means in order to maintain a harmonious relationship among all groups, 
each may have to practice a high degree of tolerance for any emerging issues. 
Unfortunately, ulama leaders from PAS believed that remaining in PR dominated by 
multi-ethic PKR and DAP means that PAS is at risk of giving up its fundamental vision 
of state and society based on Islam and Syariah (Islamic law) that the party has long been 
championing (Kikue Hamayotsu 2010 : 167). Hadi and his followers realized that if their 
party wanted to compete in democratic politics, which has become increasingly 
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competitive in Malaysia, they should accept and participate in the sharing of power. In 
other words, PAS can no longer be a single party in order to achieve a victory in the 
election. However, why did PAS still maintain their decision to sever ties with PR 
although they realize the risk if they are a single party?  
 
According to the leader of the PAS Ulama Council, Harun Taib, PAS has reached 
some resolution and suggested that political cooperation between PAS and its allies in the 
opposition, especially from PKR and DAP should be reviewed due to the declined of the 
Malays support for PAS on GE 13. Kikue Hayamatsu (2010 : 166) argued that Hadi and 
his followers are increasingly dissatisfied with their party’s diminishing influence within 
PR despite making huge ideological compromises to stay within the coalition. Harun 
Taib also made some statements that the allocation of seats among PR component parties 
does not give much value to the strengthening of the position and the influence of PAS in 
PR. Besides that, he added that in order to gain more support from non-Malay, PAS had 
sold their dignity and as a result, this scenario has reduced the confidence of Malay voters 
to PAS (Al Husseyn51.blogspot).    
 
 PAS members fully supported the decision that had been suggested by Harun Taib 
and almost all of the PAS members agreed with Harun Taib although they realized that 
Harun Taib’s action will give detriment to the party. Probably every party members must 
assert their loyalty to the party and there should be no objection from the grassroots. PAS 
top leadership always gives advice and encouragement to their followers to get involve 
strongly in any discussion on the party matters, but in reality, there were no platform for 
PAS’s members to make the argument. Besides that, Mohd Izani (2014 : 43) argued that 
PAS’s influence in PR is weakening despite an increase in public support. In other words, 
PAS is not a leader but merely a follower in PR. However, Hadi and his followers had 
make thousands of announcements that their party should lead the PR due to the 
reputation, seniority and establishment of their party.  
 
Coalition in a majority system offers ways to win voters’ votes. Bargsted and 
Kedar (2009) mentioned that in a majority system, voters’ preference are subjective, but 
they are likely to incorporate chances for victory when choosing a candidate or political 
party, either individually or as part of a coalition, before casting their ballots. According 
to Mahathir, before his party joined PH, he gave some advice to the opposition party that 
they will never be able to topple BN if they fought each other. Mahathir warned the 
opposition parties that if they wanted to be a part of the government or ruling party, they 
have to temporarily forget about their enmity with each other in order to pursue their 
vision. Therefore, Hadi and his followers should have taken Mahathir’s advice into 
consideration because Mahathir has a wide experience in Malaysian politics and the 
greatest is he was a prime minister before.   
 
Conclusion  
 
Wickham (2004 : 207-212) argued that leaders and political parties moderated their 
agendas in order to exploit new opportunities for electoral participation created by 
democratization. Based on democratic process, leaders and political parties were willing 
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to de-radicalize their stances, including efforts to reconstruct, renounce violence and 
abandon the goal of revolution in post-transition elections, particularly in Southern 
Europe and Latin America. However, Hadi as a President PAS believes that his party has 
a strong fundamental to rule the country without support from other political parties. 
Furnivall (1948) mentioned that “a plural society is rich with conflicts” and Hadi should 
take a note with this statement although he has strong confidence that PAS has their own 
strength to manage Malaysia.    
 
 This research found that although Hadi was a veteran politician, he asserts that his 
ideology, characterized, political thought and the way he solved the political problem are 
against PH. Hadi is categorized as an arrogant person, often disagrees with his 
colleagues, lacking of coalition spirit and always making a controversial statements 
towards PH. In Fadzil Noor’s era, he emphasized that PAS needed to combine the 
strength of the religiously and the non-religiously educated members and this statement 
showed that PAS members should seriously involve themselves in political cooperation 
in order to be a good government. However, Hadi believe that his own strategy and his 
arts of politic could make his party a reliable party and PAS can survive without 
collaborating with other political parties. As a conclusion, Hadi was an out dated 
politician although he is supposed to get a noble prize in his career as a politician.     
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1 Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang retained the PAS presidency by a landslide in the party’s first open contest 
for the post in over half a decade this week. Joining him was a fresh line-up of leaders comprising those 
endorsed by the party’s Ulama or clergy wing, who similarly trounced their so-called progressive 
contenders. There was never any doubt that Abdul Hadi would defeat his challenger, former vice-president 
Ahmad Awang. That was before the Ulama wing released its “cai”, or “menu”, of candidates whom it 
endorsed as the preferred leaders to direct the party’s future, just a day before the elections, which all but 
buried their rivals’ chances. For details, refer Zurairi Ar. June, 7, 2015. Three things we learned from the 
PAS Muktamar. http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/three-things-we-learned-from-the-
pas-muktamar. (April 11, 2018).  
2 Sohyo unions are strongest in the public sector: among teachers, railway workers, postal office and local 
government employees in particular. These unions can provide fairly powerful campaign machines in the 
relatively small constituencies of semi-urban and rural Japan where their members enjoy extensive 
community ties and in the case of public school teachers in particular, are part of the local social elite: they 
can support candidates there better than they can among the more anonymous, less easily mobilized voters 
of Japan’s large urban and metropolitan election districts (Curtis 1988 : 118). 
3 The opposition bloc was formed in April 2008, uniting opposition parties that had long been pushed 
around by the governing Umno-led Barisan Nasional (BN). Experts said PR was always a fragile alliance, 
given that it brought together bedfellows who were opposed ideologically, particularly the Islamist PAS 
and the secular DAP. The PR currently controls three states: Kelantan (PAS-led), Penang (DAP-led) and 
Selangor (PKR-led). The DAP holds 37 of 222 seats in Malaysia's parliament, the PKR 29, and PAS 21. 
For details, refer Asrul Haji Abdullah Sani, Jun 18, 2015. Break up of Malaysia's opposition bloc Pakatan 
Rakyat: What happened and what's next? http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/break-up-of-malaysias-
opposition-bloc-pakatan-rakyat-what-happened-and-whats-next. (April 17, 2018).  
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4 The Malaysian United Indigenous Party or Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM), informally known as 
BERSATU, is a political party in Malaysia. The party is led by former Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad as Chairman and Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin as President. The party officially registered on Sept 
7, 2016.  
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